Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel in Light of Texaco by McCann, Michelle
Boston College Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 4
7-1-1998
Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel in Light
of Texaco
Michelle McCann
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle McCann, Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel in Light of Texaco, 39 B.C.L. Rev. 965
(1998), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol39/iss4/4
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE:
CRACKER BARREL IN LIGHT OF TEXACO
INTRODUCTION
In June 1994, six employees filed suit against Texaco, Inc., claim-
ing that the company failed to hire and promote African-Americans.'
Alleged incidents included the use of racial epithets by white senior
executives to black employees,' The plaintiffs, who grew to a class of
1400 employees, sought $520 million in damages,'
The lawsuit progressed slowly until November 4, 1996 when the
New York Times published the transcript of an audio taped August 1994
meeting of Texaco executives.' The tapes recorded the top officials
making vulgar racist remarks and belittling black employee grievances. 5
The executives referred to African-American employees as "black jelly
beans." One executive was taped complaining about black workers'
demand for recognition of the holiday Kwanzaa, stating, "I'm still
having trouble with Hanukkah. "7 Within days of the release of the
tapes, Texaco stock dropped three dollars a share, which equaled
approximately one billion dollars in losses for sharcholders. 8 Reverend
Jesse Jackson and other civil rights leaders called for a national con-
sumer boycott of the oil company. 9
Within two weeks of the scandal, Texaco agreed to pay $176.1
million to settle the case, the largest settlement ever in a United States
discrimination lawsuit." As part of the $176.1 million settlement, Tex-
' See Peter Fritsch, Trustee of Big Fund With Texaco Stock Says lizpe Shows 'Culture of Disrespect,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at A5; Julie Solomon, Texaco's Troubles: A Scandal Over Racial Slurs
Forces the Oil Giant to Rethink—and Remake—Its Corporate Identity, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1996, at
49.
2 See Manna Sullivan & Rochelle Sharpe, Texaco to Pay $176.1 Million in Bias Suit: Record
Settlement Includes Task Force Possessing Oversight Power, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 18, 1996, at A3.
3 See Fritsch, supra note 1, at A5.
See Kurt Eichcnwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape, Discussed Impeding a Bias Suit, N.Y. Tisers,
Nov. 4, 1996, at Al; Excerpts From Tapes In Discrimination Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at
D4; Solomon, supra note 1, at 18.
See Eichcnwald, supra note 4, at Al; Excerpts From Tapes In Discrimination Lawsuit, supra
note 4, at D4.
6 See Excerpts From Tapes In Discrimination Lawsuit, supra note 4, at D4.
7 See Eichcnwald, supra note 4, at Al.
"See Jack E. White, Texaco's High-Octane Racism Problems: Piles of Cash and Substantial
Reforms Fail to Reverse the Call for a Boycott, TIME, Nov. 25, 1996, at 34.
9 See id.
1 ° See Sullivan & Sharpe, supra note 2, at AS.
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aco would pay $115 million in cash to the 1400 plaintiffs, $26.1 million
for pay raises over the next five years and $35 million for diversity
programs, including scholarship and internship programs." The set-
tlement included the establishment of an independent task force,
consisting of three representatives of the plaintiffs, three representa-
tives of management and a chairperson agreed upon by the other six,
to oversee the company's employment policies.' 2
Texaco is not alone in suffering severe financial setbacks as a result
of its employment policies.° Companies like Shoney's Inc., Mitsubishi
Motor Manufacturing of America Inc., Publix Supermarkets Inc. and
Home Depot Inc. recently have been embroiled in costly and publicly
damaging racial and gender bias lawsuits." The expense and negative
publicity of these employment discrimination lawsuits have made ap-
parent the adverse effects of employment policies on a company's
bottom line.' The lawsuits, especially the case against Texaco, eluci-
date the necessity of management accountability to owners for employ-
ment decisions. 16
This Note discusses the need for shareholder participation in
employment policies through the shareholder proposal process. Un-
der Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress
gave the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") the power to adopt
rules allowing shareholders the right to submit proposals to manage-
ment for inclusion in the corporation's proxy materials." The SEC
enacted Rules 14a-8 and 14a-9, which make it unlawful for a company
to omit a shareholder proposal that complies with the conditions
provided in the Rules.° Rule 14a-8(c) (7) allows companies to omit
proposals that deal with ordinary business operations.'' The SEC has
struggled with whether proposals involving employment policies, like
equal employment opportunity and affirmative action, arc excludable
as ordinary business matters." The SEC stated in its 1976 Interpretive
'' See White, supra note 8, at 33.
"See id.
13 See David A. Price, fob-Bias Lawsuits Skyrocket, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 13, 1997, at Al.
14 See id.
15 See Ccorgel Church, On the Job: Equality Pays: Corporate America Has Its Own Reason To
Weed Out Discrimination—The Bottom Line, TIME, June 23, 1997, at 39.
16 See Joann S. Lublin, Management: Texaco Case Causes a Stir in Boardrooms, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 1996, at Bl.
17 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1991).
is See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8, 14a-9 (1997).
19 See id § 240.14a-8 (c) (7) .
20 See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCU) 79,690, at 78,116 (Apr. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Capital Cities/ABC No-Action
Letter]; American Telephone & Telegraph Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WI, 235275, at *15
(Dec. 21, 1988) [hereinafter AT&T No-Action Letter].
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Release that proposals dealing with matters that have significant policy
implications must be included in the proxy statement. In a 1992 no-
action letter to Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. ("Cracker Bar-
rel"), however, the SEC declared that corporations no longer would be
required to include shareholder proposals on social issues if they
related to general employment. issues. 21 The SEC is currently reassess-
ing that position.
Section I of this Note describes other recent employment discrimi-
nation lawsuits that show the consequences of management control
over employment policies.22 Section II provides background on Section
14(a) and the shareholder proposal process. 23 Section III examines the
ordinary business exception and the SEC interpretation of the excep-
tion in Cracker Barrel. 21 This section illustrates the SEC's difficulty in
applying the exception to proposals involving employment policies.
Section IV explores the reaction to Cracker Barrel and its proposed
reversa1.2' Finally, this Note argues that in light of the costly employ-
ment litigation of recent years, the SEC position in Cracker Barrel
should be reversed."
I. OTHER EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWSUITS NEGATIVELY
AFFECTING SHAREHOLDERS
The Texaco case is not an anomaly. 27 There have been numerous
high stakes employment discrimination lawsuits in recent years. 28 Like
Texaco, Shoney's Inc. recently suffered negative publicity and financial
strain from a racial bias lawsuit. 29 In 1989, eighteen black employees
sued the restaurant chain for class-wide discrimination against black
employees and job applicants, seeking a minimum of $530 million in
damages and a court-ordered affirmative action plan." The plaintiffs
claimed that executives, supervisors and managers disparaged, denied
21 See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (1976) !hereinafter 1976 Interpretive Release' ;
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [ 1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) IE 76;118, at 77,284, 77,287 (Oct. 13, 1992).
22 See infra notes 27-61 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 82-153 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 187-263 and accompanying text.
27 See Price, supra note 13, at Al.
29 See id.
29 See Dorothy J. Gaiter, Eating Crow: How Shoney's, Belted By a Lawsuit, Found the Path to
Diversity, WALL ST, J., Apr. 16, 1996, at 84.
s° See Shoney's Inc.: fudge Approves Settlement of Racial Bias Lawsuit, WALL ST, j„ Jan. 26, 1993,
at B4.
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promotions, fired or declined to hire blacks. 31 Allegations arose that
Shoncy's then chairman and principal shareholder, Raymond Danner,
espoused a company policy that "too many blacks" were not good for
business." Plaintiffs claimed that Danner referred to blacks as "nig-
gers" and ordered managers to keep black employees out of public
view." Managers testified to a company strategy of weeding out minor-
ity job applicants by color-coding applications—a blackened-in "0" in
the word Shoney's on the application meant the applicant was black
and would not be called back for an interview. 34 When word of the
lawsuit was made public, Shoney's stock tumbled from $20 a share to
as low as $7.50 a share."
Avoiding the negative publicity and expense of a trial, in 1992,
Shoney's settled the suit for $134.5 million, $105 million of which
would be available to over 20,000 employees. 36 Considering Shoney's
relative size, the settlement was much more damaging than the Texaco
settlements? The Wall Street Journal reported that the settlement
"walloped" the restaurant chain's earnings in 1992 and that the com-
pany posted a $26.6 million loss for the year. 38
The settlement also required Shoney's to integrate its work force
completely, under the scrutiny of plaintiffs' lawyers, and required that
managers provide detailed information about the company's affirma-
tive action progress." Soon after the suit was filed, Shoney's made an
agreement with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
("SCLC") that the company would pay $30 million over three years to
recruit more minorities, to purchase from black vendors and to assist
blacks in acquiring franchises." In 1996, the Wall Street Journal re-
31 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at 134.
32 See STEVE WATKINS, THE BLACK 0: RACISM AND REDEMPTION IN AN AMERICAN CORPORATE
EMPIRE 4 (1997).
33 See Brett Pulley, Strained Family: Culture of Racial Bias at Shoney's Underlies Chairman's
Departure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1992 at Al.
:44 See WATKINS, supra note 32, at 5; Pulley, supra note 33, at Al.




 In January 1997, attorney Paul Neuhauser submitted a statement to the SEC on behalf of
shareholders who presented a proposal to Shoney's Inc. requesting the company prepare an equal
employment opportunity report. See Shoney's Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 9826, at *17
(Jan. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Shoney's No-Action Letter]. By analysing the 1995 revenues of
Texaco and Shoney's, he calculated that a comparable settlement for Texaco would have cost
approximately $9.5 billion as compared to the $176 million it actually paid. See id,
38 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4.
59 See Michael J. McCarthy & Glenn Ruffenach, Shoney's Chief Resigns, in Move Surprising
Board, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1992, at 134.
4I) See Pulley, supra note 33, at Al.
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ported that Shoney's had spent more than $194 million on minority
organizations and salaries to repair its image after the lawsuit."
In recent years, there also have been many widely-publicized sex-
ual discrimination lawsuits.° Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of Amer-
ica Inc. is currently embroiled in what could be the nation's largest
sexual harassment lawsuit. 45 In April 1996, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a class-action lawsuit against
Mitsubishi that covers over five hundred women employed at the
Normal, Illinois factory." The EEOC alleged that the company toler-
ated a work environment in which female employees were fondled and
routinely called bitches and whores, and obscene graffiti was placed
on factory walls. 45 The more than five hundred potential plaintiffs each
could be eligible for $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages,
possibly costing Mitsubishi a total of $150 million.'" Reverend Jesse
Jackson and the National Organization of Women organized a nation-
wide boycott and picketing of Mitsubishi dealerships in response to the
sexual harassment charges. 47 Mitsubishi has continued to face intense
financial and public relations setbacks because of the lawsuit."
Two corporations recently settled expensive and widely-publicized
sex-bias lawsuits.'" In January 1997, Publix Supermarkets Inc. settled a
class-action sex discrimination lawsuit that covered about 150,000 cur-
rent and former female employees for $81.5 million." The plaintiffs
claimed that the grocery store chain routinely had denied them "de-
sirable job assignments, promotions and management opportuni dee"'
One of the plaintiffs complained that she attempted to obtain a pro-
41 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4.
42 See Price, supra note 13, at Al.
43 See EEOG Official Says Mitsubishi Motor Suit Isn't Near Settlement, WALL Sr, J., May 13, 1996,
at B5.
44 See Peter Annin & John McCormick, More Than a Tune-up: Tough Going in a Fight Against
Sexual Harassment, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1997, at 50. In August 1997, Mitsubishi settled a similar
lawsuit for $9.5 million. See id. Twenty-nine female employees filed suit in December of 1994
claiming that Mitsubishi fostered a climate of sexual harassment. See id. at 52.
45 See Rochelle Sharpe, F.E0C Sues Mitsubishi Unit For Harassment, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 10, 1996,
at Bl.
46 See id.
47 See Mitsubishi Motors Boycott Expanding To Some Partners, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at A7.
48 See Mitsubishi Picketing Concerning Lawsuits Is Readied by Groups, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1996,
at 133.
49 See Price, supra note 13, at Al.
" See Glenn Ruffenach, Publix Supermarkets Will Pay $81.5 Million to Settle Bias Suit, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 27, 1997 (available in 1997 WL 2407172).
51 See id.
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motion from a cashier's job but was told by management that women
were incapable of working in supervisory positions. 52
In November 1997, Home Depot, Inc. settled a class-action sex-
bias suit, agreeing to pay $87.5 million. 53 The case potentially covered
more than 200,000 current and former employees and job applicants,
who claimed that the home improvement retailer discriminated
against women by limiting their advancement and promotional oppor-
tunities. 51
 Home Depot projected that the settlement could result in a
twenty-one percent decrease in the company's 1997 third quarter per
share earnings."
The costliness of these lawsuits is due in part to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allows discrimination plaintiffs the right
to recover compensatory and punitive damages." The Act also gives
plaintiffs the option of a jury trial, which may help plaintiffs recover
higher damages. 57 Furthermore, courts' willingness to allow plaintiffs
to proceed as a class-action has increased the stakes of employment
litigation.58
The costs of discriminatory employment policies have the poten-
tial to seriously harm the financial condition of a company and dimin-
ish shareholder value." In response to these lawsuits, 6° shareholders
have increased pressure to play a role in employment policy decision-
52 Set id.
58 See Jacqueline Buell°, Home Depot's Agreement to Settle Suit Could Cut 3rd-Quarter Earnings
by 21%, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 818.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (1994); Price, supra note 13, at Al.
The Act states in relevant part: "In an action brought by a complaining party under ... the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination ... ,
the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages . . ." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1).
57 See42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c); Price, supra note 13, at Al. The Act states that "Id f a complaining
party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section . . . any party may demand a
trial by jury ... ." See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
58 See Price, supra note 13, at Al.
59 See Church, supra note 15, at 38-39.
°Increased shareholder activism through the shareholder proposal process after recent
discrimination lawsuits is evidenced by the number of statements submitted to the SEC with
company requests for no-action letters that refer to the Texaco and Shoney's cases to support the
inclusion of employment-related proposals in the proxy statement. See, e.g., Rite Aid Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40240, at *4 (Jan. 26, 1998) (referring to Shoney's and Texaco
settlements as support for resolution to report on company's equal employment opportunity
data); Shoney's No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 9826, at *15-17 (arguing that equal employment
opportunity issues affect the bottom line and therefore are of enormous concern to sharehold-
ers).
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making. They see the shareholder proposal process as a way to change
company policies and thereby protect their investment,'''
II. Ti nt SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL PROCESS
A. Section 14(a)
Proxy solicitation has become an important means for socially
responsible investors to voice ownership concerns to management and
demand changes in company policies."' The use of shareholder pro-
posals in proxy materials for social purposes emerged in the early
1970s, when shareholders submitted proposals seeking corporate with-
drawal from South Africa." Shareholders also began to submit propos-
als on employment-related issues in the 1970s, requesting that compa-
nies disclose their equal employment opportunity data."
The right of shareholders to submit proposals for proxy solicita-
tion developed out of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Congress delegated to the SEC the power to regulate proxy
materials as it deemed "necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors."" It declared that proxy solicitation
in violation of the SEC rules would be unlawful."' The purpose of
Section 14(a) was to prevent management from obtaining authoriza-
tion by shareholders through deceptive or inadequate disclosure
through proxy solicitation." Congress also sought to encourage corpo-
rate democracy, stating that "[flair corporate suffrage is an important
right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public
exchange.'" The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has stated that the purpose of Section 14(a) is "to
61 See Church, supra note 15, at 38-39.
6L4 See Paul Beckett, SEC to Vote on Proxy Rule Covering Holders' Proposals on Workplace Issues,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1997, at C16; Steven M. H. Walltnan, Equality Is More Than 'Ordinary
Business,' N.Y. 'FIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, at § 3, 12.
65 See Shoncy's No-Action Letter, 1997 WI, 9826, at *14.
"See id.
63 See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1997). The Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . 	 in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit . . . any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) regis-




66 SeeJ.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
6• See id. (citation omitted).
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assure to corporate shareholders the ability to exercise their right—
some say their duty—to control the important decisions which affect
them in their capacity as stockholders."" Through the voting proce-
dures of proxy solicitation, Congress intended to give stockholders a
role in the management of the corporation. 7'
B. Rule 14a-8
In 1942, the SEC, pursuant to the authority granted it under
Section 14(a), adopted Rule 14a-8, which gives shareholders the right
to submit proposals to be included in the corporation's proxy state-
ment." Rule 14a-8(a) states that if any shareholder notifies the regis-
tered company of his or her intention to present a proposal at an
upcoming meeting, the company must set forth the proposal in its
proxy statement." If a company omits a shareholder proposal in viola-
tion of Rule 14a-8, the proxy materials arc deemed misleading and the
company may be subject to an SEC enforcement action. 74 Rule 14a-8,
therefore, advances the remedial purposes of Section 14(a) by assuring
shareholder access to the company's proxy materials." It further facili-
tates communication among shareholders and between shareholders
and management."
Although Rule 14a-8 provides shareholders access to the proxy
materials, it. contains eligibility requirements and exceptions that limit
the number of proposals that a corporation will have to include in its
proxy statement." The SEC recognized the potential for companies to
76 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Medical
Comm., a shareholder brought suit against the SEC after it permitted Dow Chemical to omit a
proposal requesting that the company include in its proxy statement a resolution to discontinue
the manufacturing of napalm. Ultimately remanding the case to the SEC, the court considered
the merits of the shareholder proposal under 14a-8(c) (7). See id,
71 See id.
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
75 See 17 C.F.R, § 240.14a-8(a). Rule 14a-8(a) states in relevant part:
If any security holder of a registrant notifies the registrant of his intention to present
a proposal for action at a forthcoming meeting of the registrant's security holders,
the registrant shall set forth the proposal in its proxy statement .... Notwithstand-
ing the foregoing, thc registrant shall not be required to include the proposal in
its proxy statement or form of proxy unless the security holder has complied with
the requirements of this paragraph and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.
Id.
74 See id. § 240.14a-8, 14a-9.
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8; Borak, 377 U.S. at 431-32.
76 See Medical Comm., 432 F.2d. at 680-81.
77 In order for a shareholder to submit a proposal, he or she must own at least one percent
or $1,000 worth of stock, intend to present the proposal at the company's annual meeting and
must have owned the stock for at least one year and continue to own the stock until the annual
meeting. See id. § 240.14a-8(a) (1). The company must receive the proposal four months before
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become inundated with proposals. 78 It also recognized the amount of
time and money that companies must spend to comply with Rule
14a-8. 79 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit explained, the SEC did not intend to make proxy
solicitations "an all-purpose forum for malcontented shareholders to
vent their spleen about irrelevant matters."' Therefore, the SEC im-
posed restrictions that limit congestion and reduce the number of
proposals that a company must include in its proxy statement. 81
III. THE ORDINARY BUSINESS EXCEPTION
The exception companies wishing to omit employment-related
shareholder proposals commonly use is Rule 14a-8(c) (7), the ordinary
business operations exception. 82 Adopted in 1953, Rule 14a-8(c) (7)
states that a registrant may omit a proposal if it "deals with a matter
relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the
registrant."3 Recognizing the impracticability of investor involvement
in daily business matters, the SEC crafted the exception to relieve'
companies of the burden of including in the proxy materials proposals
dealing with routine business decisions that arc normally within the
discretion of management." The exception allows management to use
its expertise to handle the complexities of the daily operation of a
company without shareholder in terference. 85 Although the purpose of
the exception of proposals on matters best left to the specialized skills
of management is clear, the SEC has struggled to establish a workable
the annual meeting. See id. g 240.14a-8(a) (3) (i). A company can exclude a proposal that failed
to garner a certain percentage of the votes at a previous annual meeting. See id. § 240.14a.
8(c) (12). There arc also exceptions to Rule 14(a) (8). See, e.g., § 240,14a-8(c)(5) (proposal not
significantly related to the company's business operations); 14a-8(c) (7) (proposal related to
ordinary business operations); Pla-8(e) (10) (proposal rendered moot).
78 See Alan R. Pahniter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation,
45 ALA. L. Rev. 879, 886-87 (1994). The SEC recently estimated that between 300 and 400
companies receive a total of about 900 shareholder proposals per year. See Amendments to Rules
on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093 [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCI I) 85,961, at 89,851 (proposed Sept. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Proposed Rules!.
"According to the results of an SEC questionnaire in which 67 companies responded,
companies spend an average of around S50,000 in printing costs to include shareholder propos-
als. See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093 [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) at 89,876, The cost to companies to consider and prepare a submission under Rule
lla-8 to the SEC, including internal and external legal fees, averaged around $37,000, based on
the responses of 80 companies. See id.
"Medical Comm., 432 F.2d at 678.
81 See Palliate'', supra note 78, at 885.
82 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (7).
83 Id.
84 See Medical Comm., 432 F.2d at 678.
85 See id. at 679.
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definition of "ordinary business operations."86 In particular, the SEC
has had difficulty applying the exception to proposals that relate to an
operational decision but also concern a significant social issue." Such
proposals fall under the "business operations" language but not under
the "ordinary" language of Rule 14a-8(c) (7). 88 The application of the
exception to employment-related proposals has been especially prob-
lcmatic. 89 Companies attempt to omit proposals involving employment
practices because hiring and firing seems to fall within ordinary busi-
ness decisions. 9° The SEC has had difficulty condoning such omissions
when the hiring and firing decisions also involve social policies, like
discrimination .9 '
A. The 1976 Interpretive Release
The SEC attempted to clarify the meaning of "ordinary business
operations" and to adopt a more workable standard for application of
the exception in its 1976 Interpretive Release." The SEC adopted the
Release after a formal notice and comment rule-making period, there-
by rendering the legislative rule legally binding." The SEC recom-
mended a flexible interpretation of the 14a-8(c) (7) exception in the
Release." It stated:
the term "ordinary business operations" has been deemed on
occasion to include certain matters which have significant
policy, economic or other implications inherent in them. For
instance, a proposal that a utility company not construct a
proposed nuclear power plant has in the past been consid-
ered excludable . . . In retrospect, however, it seems appar-
ent that the economic and safety considerations attendant to
nuclear power plants are of such magnitude that a determi-
86 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (c)(7); Medical Comm., 432 F.2d at 678-79.
87 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (Cal)
1[ 76,418, at 77,287 (expressing difficulty of SEC in line-drawing under ordinary business excep-
tion).
88 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (7).
" See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI I)
at 77,287 ("the line between includable and excludable employment-related proposals based on
social policy considerations has become increasingly difficult to draw").
"See, e.g., AT&T No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235275 (Dec. 21, 1988).
91 See id.
92 See 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (1976).
95 See Amalgamatcd Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("ACFWU") v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,
821 F. Supp. 877, 883-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter "ACTWU I").
94 See 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
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nation whether to construct one is not an "ordinary" business
matter. Accordingly, proposals of that nature, as well as others
that have major implications, will in the future be considered
beyond the realm of an issuer's ordinary business operations,
and future interpretive letters of the Commission's staff will
reflect that view. 95
The SEC drew the line between business matters that are "mundane
in nature" and matters involving "substantial policy or other consid-
erations. "943
B. SEC Review of Ordinary Business Exception
Although the SEC attempted to provide a clear standard for the
ordinary business exception in its 1976 Interpretive Release, the SEC
has struggled in applying the ordinary business operations exception
through no-action letters t17 If a company wishes to exclude a proposal
from the proxy materials based on the eligibility requirements and
exceptions, it may submit the proposal to the SEC with a written
explanation of its reasons for the ornission. 98 The SEC will respond in
a letter staling whether it will recommend action against the company
for the exclusion.`'`' The purpose of this no-action letter is to aid com-
panies in determining whether to include proposals)°°
The no-action letters are not binding on the SEC, the courts or
the parties." The SEC's determinations in these letters are confined
to the particular facts and circumstances of a certain company's re-
quest for approval for omission. 102 When the SEC responds, it only gives
its opinion of whether the omission is appropriate.'" Because of the
great number of proposals submitted and the SEC's limited staff, the
SEC reviews proposals quickly and informally and rarely gives detailed




90 See l7 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d).
"See, e.g., Shoney's No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 9826, at *33 (Jan. 10, 1997).
I" See id. (as part of no-action letter, SEC writes that it "believes that its responsibility with
respect to matters arising under Rule I4a-8 ... is to aid those who must comply with the rule by
offering informal advice and suggestions").





tt4 The SEC has enclosed a statement with its no-action letters emphasizing the informal
nature of the shareholder proposal procedure. See Shoney's No•Action Letter, 1997 WI 9826, at
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taken in no-action letters and is free to reverse its previous decisions.'"
Although no-action letters offer guidance to companies when assessing
whether the SEC will take action against them for excluding a proposal,
relying on a no-action letter can be dangerous.'" Even though the SEC
may state in such a letter that it will not recommend enforcement
action against a company, it may still take action. 1 U 7
Furthermore, no-action letters arc not binding on the courts.'"
Because no-action letters are not adopted according to formal rule-
making, they do not have a precedential value to which courts must
defer.'" Reliance on an SEC no-action letter may be risky for a com-
pany if a lawsuit. is brought against it."° That a company omitted a
proposal in reliance on a no-action letter is not a defense to a securities
violation claim."'
In its review of employment-related proposals in no-action letters
before 1992, the SEC decided on a case-by-case basis whether a pro-
posal related to everyday operational decisions or involved a significant
policy issue elevating it from the realm of the ordinary business excep-
tion." 2 The SEC consistently deemed proposals regarding such matters
as employee health benefits, general compensation issues, manage-
ment of the workplace, employee supervision, labor-management re-
lations, employee hiring and firing, conditions of employment and
employee training and motivation as falling within the ordinary busi-
ness operations exception."' These proposals fit easily into the defini-
tion of ordinary business because they involved routine personnel
matters and did not touch on significant social issues."'
*31. It states, "Mt is important to note that the staff's and Commission's no-action responses to
rule 14a-8(d) submissions reflect only informal views." Id.
1°5 See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 12.
1 °6 See id.
1°7
 See id.
108 See id. at 13; ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 885.
1 °9 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 884-85. According to the SEC's Informal Procedures
Statement, "[t] he determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate
the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S.
District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its
proxy material." See Shoney's No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 9826, at *34.
II° See ACTWU v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 54 E3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter "ACTWU
II"] (Wal-Mart's good faith reliance on SEC no-action letter did not bar plaintiff's award of
attorneys' fees).
"I See id.
1 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed, Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
at 77,287 (abandoning case-by-case approach and adopting a bright line standard).
t13 See United Technologies Co., SEC No-Action Letter [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 76,635, at 77,701 (Feb. 19, 1993) (staff listing of excludable issues).
114
 See id.
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The SEC, however, was not consistent in deciding whether issues
of affirmative action and equal employment opportunity could be
excluded as ordinary business."' In 1988, in a letter to American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("AT&T"), the full commission affirmed
a staff letter concluding that AT&T could not omit a proposal request-
ing the company to phase out its affirmative action program." 6 The
SEC reasoned that because the proposal involved policy issues—an
affirmative action program designed to give equal employment oppor-
tunities to minority groups and women—the proposal could not be
excluded under 14a-8(c) (7). 17 Until April 1991, the SEC consistently
determined that companies could not exclude proposals dealing with
affirmative action and equal employment because those proposals in-
volved policy concerns.""
In an April 1991 no-action letter to Capital Cities/ABC Inc., the
SEC narrowed its position on affirmative action and equal employment
opportunity proposals. 19 In an earlier letter to Capital Cities/ABC, the
SEC decided that the company could not exclude a proposal request-
ing the company to disclose equal employment opportunity data and
describe its affirmative action programs, stating that "questions with
respect to affirmative action involve policy decisions beyond those
personnel matters that constitute the Company's ordinary business
operations."'" Upon review of the letter by the full Commission, how-
ever, the SEC reversed the staff position. 121 It determined that because
the proposal involved detailed information about the company's work
force and employment practices, the proposal related to the company's
ordinary business operations.'" The SEC narrowed the applicability of
its earlier stance and adopted a new position—that when a proposal
115 See Capital Cities/ABC SEC No-Action Letter [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCI-1) at I 79,690, 78,120 (Apr. 4, 1991) (excluded); AT&T No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235275,
at *15 (nut excluded).
See AT&T No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235275, at *14. Upon request, the SEC will recon-
sider a prior position taken in a no-action letter when the request for reconsideration is accom-
panied by material information that has not been furnished previously. See SEC Procedures for
Staff Advice on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, [1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI I) 1 80,635, at 86,605-06 (July 7, 1976).
I L7 See AT&T No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235275, at *15.
"a See, e.g., Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178560, at *9 (Mar. 8,
1991).
119 See Capital Cities/ABC No-Action Letter, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCI.I) at 78,120.
120 Id. at 78,119.
See id. at 78,120.
122 See id.
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requests detailed information, the proposal relates more to everyday
hiring and firing decisions than to policy matters."
In another April 1991 letter to Wal-Mart, Stores, Inc., the SEC
further supported its position in Capital Cities/ABC. 124 Wal-Mart,
sought to exclude a shareholder proposal requesting information on
the company's equal employment opportunities and affirmative action
policies.'" In its no-action letter, the SEC used similar language as in
the Capital Cities/ABC no-action letter to approve the omission, stat-
ing that the proposal "involves a request for detailed information on
the composition of the Company's work force, employment practices
and policies."'"
C. The Cracker Barrel Bright Line Standard
The SEC resolved its difficulty in reaching consistent decisions
when applying the ordinary business exception to certain employment-
related proposals in no-action letters in 1992. 127 In a no-action letter to
Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., the Commission established
a bright line standard for proposals involving employment matters."
That a company's employment policy is tied to a social issue no longer
would remove the proposal from the realm of the ordinary business
exception.' 29
In January of 1991, Cracker Barrel issued a press release stating
its policy to deny employment to individuals "whose sexual preferences
fail to demonstrate normal heterosexual values." 19° Following the an-
nouncement, the company fired a number of gay employees.'"' After
public protests, pickets and boycotts, Cracker Barrel rescinded its anti-
gay policy.' 32 The company, however, did not include homosexuals in
its and-discrimination policy.'"
122 See id.
124 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178759 (Apr. 10, 1991) there-
inafter Wal-Mart No-Action Letter]; Capital Cities/ABC No-Action Letter [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) at 78,120.
125 See Wal-Mart No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178759, at *3.
12' Id.; see Capital Cities/ABC No-Action Letter, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) at 78,120.
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Cracker Barrel's actions prompted the New York City Employees'
Retirement System ("NYCERS"), a pension system of city employees
and a Cracker Barrel shareholder, to submit a proposed resolution
requesting that management implement a nondiscriminatory employ-
ment policy based on sexual orientation and add prohibitions against
such discrimination in the company employment statement.' 34 The
corporation submitted the proposal to the SEC, requesting the Com-
mission's opinion as to whether the proposal could be excluded under
the ordinary business operations exception.'" On October 13, 1992,
the SEC staff responded that the proposal could be omitted from the
proxy material as ordinary business.'m
The letter went further to establish the Commission's position on
socially-related employment proposals in future no-action letters.'"
The staff decided that the line between social policy concerns and
matters of everyday business had become too difficult to draw.'" The
Commission conceded that it lacked the resources and expertise to
make such subjective determinations on important policy issues. 159 The
letter stated, "the distinctions recognized by the staff arc characterized
by many as tenuous, without substance and effectively nullifying the
application of the ordinary business exclusion . . . .""° Therefore, the
Commission chose a bright line test for 14a-8(c) (7)—if a proposal is
employment-based in nature, it falls within the ordinary business op-
erations exception."' The SEC stated, "that a shareholder proposal
concerning a company's employment policies and practices for the
general workplace is tied to a social issue will no longer he viewed as
removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary business operations
of the registrant." Thus, after Cracker Barrel, the SEC would allow
companies to omit shareholder proposals even though they involved
substantial policy concerns.'"
In 1994, in New York City Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS")
v. SEC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
im See Cracker Barrel No•Action Letter [1992-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC1I)
at 77,284-85.
135 See id. at 77,285.
116 See id. at 77,287.
I " See id.
1 " See id.
"9 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC1.1)
at 77,287.
to Id.
" 1 See id.
192 id.
1 " See id.
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upheld the position adopted by the SEC in Cracker Barrel." After
unsuccessfully petitioning the SEC to reverse the Cracker Barrel no-ac-
tion letter, NYCERS, joined by the United States Trust Company and
the Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United
Methodist Church, sued the SEC, seeking to enjoin the Commission
from following the policy announced in the no-action letter.'" The
plaintiffs challenged the new interpretation of 14a-8(c) (7), claiming
that the Commission had established a legislative rule without subject-
ing the interpretation to notice and comment procedures and that the
new interpretation was arbitrary and capricious)"
The court upheld the new SEC interpretation of 14a-8(c) (7),
determining that the Cracker Barrel no-action letter was an interpre-
tive rule, rather than a legislative rule, and therefore was not subject
to notice and comment procedures. 147 According to the court, however,
the Cracker Barrel no-action letter did not amend the legislative rule
adopted in the 1976 Interpretive Release because it is an informal
statement and has no binding authority) 18 Thus, courts will defer to
the 1976 Interpretive Release, which stated that proposals involving
substantial policy consideration were outside the realm of ordinary
business matters.'" The court further held that the no-action letter was
not reviewable as an arbitrary or capricious action because the plain-
tiffs had an effective alternative to suing the SEC—they could institute
a private action against Cracker Barrel under Rule 14a-8 enjoining the
company from omitting their proposal in its proxy materials.' 50
Without interference from the courts, the SEC has consistently
followed the standard adopted in Cracker Barrel in later no-action
letters. 151 In a 1997 no-action letter to Shoney's, Inc., the SEC approved
the company's omission of a proposal requesting that the company
reveal equal employment opportunity data, any affirmative action pro-
grams, any litigation against the company involving race, gender and
disabilities and any policy of purchasing goods and services from mi-
nority or female-owned businesses.' 52 In another 1997 no-action letter
144 See 45 F.3d at 14.
145 See id. at 7.
146 See id, at 9.
147 See id. at 12-13.
149 See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14; 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
149 See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14; 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
15° See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14.
191 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
77,287. See, e.g., Rite Aid Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40240, at *8 (Jan. 26, 1998);
Texaco Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 58881, at *5 (Feb. 10, 1997); Shoney's No-Action
Letter, 1997 WL 9826, at *33.
152 See Shoney's No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 9826, at *31, 33.
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to Texaco, Inc., the SEC concluded that a shareholder proposal requir-
ing the company to adopt a policy to prevent discrimination and
preferential treatment on the basis or race, sex or national origin could
be omitted because it related to the conduct of the company's ordinary
business. 157
IV. CRITICISM AND PROPOSED REPEAL OF CRACKER BARREL
A. judicial, Congressional and Executive Criticism of Cracker Barrel
Although the SEC continues to follow the rule established in
Cracker Barrel, shareholders can force a company to include their
employment-related proposal in the proxy materials by suing the com-
pany in federal court.'" Although the language of Section 14(a) does
not explicitly authorize a private right of action, the Supreme Court
has held that private parties have a right to bring suit for violations of
Section 14(a). 155 Despite the effort and expense of bringing a private
action, shareholders have been successful in enjoining companies from
omitting their proposals. 156
In 1993, in Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("AC-
TWU") v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that, based on the 1976 Interpretive
Release, a shareholder proposal regarding equal employment oppor-
tunity and affirmative action programs involved significant policy con-
siderations and therefore did not fall within the ordinary business
operations exception. 157 The plaintiffs, Wal-Mart shareholders, submit-
ted a proposal to be included in the company's 1993 proxy materials,
requesting the board of directors to report on the company's equal
employment opportunity and affirmative action policies. 158 After receiv-
ing a no-action letter agreeing with the company's proposed omission,
Wal-Mart excluded the proposal from its proxy materia1. 159 Plaintiffs
sued Wal-Mart, alleging that the omission violated Rule 14a-8. 16" Wal-
155 See Texaco Ittc., SEC NoAction Letter, 1997 WL 58881, at *5.
154 SeeP. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 430 (1964).
155 See 15 U.S.C. § 7811(a); Barak, 377 U.S. at 430.
156 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 892; NYCERS v. Dole Food Co., 795 F. Supp. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); NYCERS v. American Brands, Inc., 654 F. Stapp. 1382, 1392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Lovenheitn
v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 562 (D.D.C. 1985).
157 SeeAmalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 821 F. Stapp.
877, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (1976).
I" See ACTWU I, 821 F. Stapp. at 879.
159 See id.
to See id.
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Mart asserted that the proposal could be excluded because it related
to ordinary business operations. 16 '
In an opinion written by judge Kimba Wood, the court refused to
defer to the SEC no-action letter sent to Wal-Mart and the standard
adopted in Cracker-Barrel and held that the proposal could not be
excluded because it dealt with matters of social import. 162 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the 1976 Interpretive Release's
definition of the ordinary business operations exception, rather than
the interpretation adopted by the SEC in Cracker Barrel. 16" Because
the Interpretive Release was subjected to formal notice and comment
rule-making procedures, the court refused to defer to an inconsistent
position taken in a later no-action letter.'" According to the court, the
SEC was free to abandon its interpretation taken in the 1976 Release,
but it had to do so by following the appropriate procedures)" The
court stated that until the SEC amended its rules through notice and
comment procedures, courts should defer to the standard adopted
in the 1976 Interpretive ReIease.' 66 Therefore, the SEC position in
Cracker Barrel did not completely eliminate shareholder access to
proxy materials for employment-related proposals.' 67
The courts are not alone in their disagreement with the SEC
interpretation of "ordinary business operations" in its no-action let-
ters. 16" Congress recently mandated that the SEC conduct a study of
the shareholder proposal process.' 69 The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 required the Commission to conduct a study
of (1) the impairment of shareholder access to proxy statements by
161
 See id.
"2 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 892.
1113 See id. at 890; 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fcd. Reg. at 52,998.
164 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 890, n.13; 1976 interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
165 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 890, 11.13; 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
166 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 892; 1976 Interpretive Release, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
167 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 892. On appeal in 1995, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that shareholders were entitled to an award of attorneys fees, even
though their proposal was defeated at a previous annual meeting. See Acrwu 11 v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 54 F.3d 69, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1995). The district court granted summary judgment for the
shareholders and awarded them attorneys fees. See id. at 70. After the ruling, Wal-Mart included
the proposal in its 1993 proxy materials and the proposal was defeated by approximately 90% of
the voting shares. See id. at 70, 71. Wal-Mart appealed the award of attorneys fees, claiming that
because the proposal was defeated, the litigation had not conferred a substantial benefit on the
class members. See id. at 71. The Court of Appeals held that the promotion of corporate suffrage
on a significant policy issue was a sufficiently substantial benefit to warrant an award of attorneys
fees. See id. at 72.
168 See ACTWU I, 821 F. Supp. at 892.
If° See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (1997) (Study
and Report on Shareholder Access to Proxy Statements).
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recent statutory, judicial, or regulatory changes and (2) the ability of
shareholders to have proposals relating to corporate practices and
social issues included as part of the proxy statement) 7° The Commis-
sion must report back to Congress within a year with any recommen-
dations for regulatory or legislative changes that it believes necessary
to improve shareholder access to proxy materials.' 7 '
The executive department has also spoken out against the SEC's
position in Cracker Barrel.'" Former Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich,
urged the Commission to reassess its interpretation of excludable
shareholder proposals to include proposals relating to sweatshops and
working conditions.'" Reich stated, "there's a legitimate argument
to be made that if a company is substantially involved in an important
issue facing the country that transcends that individual company,
shareholders ought to be permitted to vote on that company's role."174
The former Secretary's statements were in response to a proposal
relating to alleged sweatshop conditions at factories that produce Dis-
ney products.'"
Even members of the SEC staff have pressured the Commission
to repeal Cracker Barrel.'" Former SEC Commissioner, Steven M.H.
Wallman, openly criticized the SEC's stance on employment policies.'"
Wallman referred to continuation of Cracker Barrel as a "terrible
mistake."'" He stated, "Cracker Barrel is bad public policy because the
wrong message is sent as to what the Commission believes is impor-
tant."'" Wallman considers discriminatory hiring policies to be an
important public policy matter that should not be excluded from
proposals because of the ordinary business exception.' 8"
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See Stuart Silverstein, Voles on Employment Practices Urged Labor: Reich's Call to Involve





176 See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (Cap at 89,882 (Walltnan concurrence).
177 See Rachel Witmer, SEC Proposes Reversal of tracker Barrel' In Revamped Shareholder
Proposal System, 29 Sec. Reg, & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1285 (Sept. 19, 1997).
176 Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093 [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed, Sec. L.
Rep. (CC14) at 89,883-84 (Wallman concurrence).
176 Id. at 89,884.
"See id.
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B. The Proposed Amendments
In response to the criticism, in September of 1997, the SEC pro-
posed new rules on shareholder access to proxy materials that would
reverse its position in Cracker Barrel. 1 e' The SEC would no longer
automatically exclude shareholder proposals involving employment
practices under the ordinary business exception.' 82 Instead, the SEC
would return to its earlier practice of determining whether employ-
ment-related proposals could be excluded on a case-by-case basis.'"
The repeal of Cracker Barrel was proposed in a package of other
proposed amendments to 14a-8.'" Attempting to balance the interests
of shareholders and companies, the SEC tied the repeal to other
proposed reforms that would allow companies to exclude more pro-
posals from the proxy materials.'" The SEC is presently taking com-
ment on the proposed repeal of Cracker Barrel and other 14a-8 re-
forms.'"
V. ANALYSIS
In light of the enormous .costs of employment discrimination
today, the SEC must reverse its position in Cracker Barrel. 187 Cracker
Barrel rests on the assumption that all employment policies arc ordi-
nary business matters.'" A policy that can potentially devastate the
"/L See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093 [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec,
L. Rep. (Cal) at 89,848.
"12 See id. at 89,858.
183
 See id.
184 See id. at 89,849.
185 See id. To accommodate corporate interests, the SEC suggested imposing stricter eligibility
standards for submitting proposals, proposing that a shareholder must own $2,000 in market
value of the company stock, rather than $1,000. See id. at 89,866. The proposed rules would
change the requiretnents for resubmission of proposals that received an insignificant percentage
of the vote in the previous year. See id. at 89,859. Under the new rules, a company could exclude
a proposal if it failed to receive at least 6% of the vote on the first submission, 15% on the second
and 30% on the third. See id. The current requirements are 3%, 6% and 10%. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(c) (12). The SEC accommodated shareholder interests in addition to the repeal of
Cracker Barrel by introducing an override mechanism. See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 39,093, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-I) at 89,860-61. The rule would allow
shareholders to override a company's decision to exclude a proposal by mustering 3% of the
company's share ownership. See id.
'al' See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, (1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) at 89,848.
1 ° 7 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder' Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CC1-I) at 77,287.
188 See id.
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financial condition of a company is hardly ordinary.m Although the
proposed amendments call for the reversal of Cracker Barrel, the SEC
does not go far enough to address the need for shareholder access to
employment decisions.'" Instead of adopting a bright line test to re-
place Cracker Barrel, the SEC currently proposes to return to the
uncertainty of subjective determinations of social import by SEC staff
members. 191 The SEC should adopt a standard that would include in
the proxy materials shareholder proposals involving employment mat-
ters that can result in high stakes litigation and thereby harm the
company's financial condition.
The numerous and expensive employment discrimination lawsuits
against major corporations in recent years make apparent the need for
reversal of the SEC position on employment-related proposals in
Cracker Barrel. 192 it is difficult to reconcile the high stakes involved in
employment litigation with the SEC belief that employment polices are
ordinary day-to-day business matters.'" As the Texaco and Shoncy's
cases indicate, employment discrimination lawsuits have the potential
to seriously harm the financial condition of a company and diminish
shareholder value. 19"
Because of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the ease with which
plaintiff's can achieve class-action status, companies face the prospect
of enormous damages in employment discrimination lawsuits.'" For
companies wishing to avoid the risk of unlimited damages and the
negative publicity and costs of a trial, settlement payments can be
staggering.'"Although the payment of $176.1 million to settle discrimi-
nation claims did not devastate Texaco, considering its size and reve-
nues, the $134.5 million settlement charge against Shoncy's seriously
affected the company's financial position. 197 Home Depot also reported
financial setbacks after its settlement of a class action gender bias
case.'" Furthermore, employment practices may have adverse effects
189 See id.
190 See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, (1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCM) at 89,857-58,
19 ' See id.
192 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, [1992-1995 Transfer Binder( Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CG1.1) at 77,287; Price, supra note 13, at Al.
193 See Cracker Barrel No•Action Letter, [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CC11)
at 77,287.
194 See Church, supra note 15, at 38-39; Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4.
195 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Price, supra note 13, at Al.
199 See Church, supra note 15, at 38-39; Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4.
197 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4.
198 See Bueno, supra note 53, at B18.
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on stock values as evidenced by the performance of Texaco and
Shoncy's stock while the companies were immersed in lawsuits.' 99 Em-
ployee morale may suffer because of a company's insensitive personnel
policies, which can lead to decreased productivity. 20D The negative pub-
licity emanating from employment lawsuits may also translate into
losses in revenue. 20 ' The publishing of the audio tape transcripts of
Texaco executives resulted in a national boycott." When allegations
were made public in the sexual harassment lawsuit against Mitsubishi,
the picketing of dealerships and a nation-wide boycott soon followed."
Because of losses in revenues stemming from consumer avoidance
and negative publicity, companies may have to spend significant sums
to repair their image after embarrassing lawsuits." By 1996, Shoney's
had spent almost two hundred million dollars since its 1992 settlement,
pumping money into minority organizations, recruitment of minorities
and minority salaries, in an attempt to erase the perception of Shoney's
as a racist enterprise." Furthermore, management must spend its time
developing programs to improve public relations rather than running
the company. 206
Another possible result of an employment lawsuit is the loss of
management control over employment decisions, which also can affect
a company's condition. 207 For example, as part of the Texaco settle-
ment, management gave up control over the company's personnel
policies to an independent task force." The financial consequences
of recent employment litigation show that management's control of
employment policies can affect the bottom line."
Because employment policies have the potential to impact share-
holder value adversely, the SEC must repeal its position in Cracker
Barrel which currently denies shareholder access to the proxy materi-
als on employment rnatters. 2 m In Cracker Barrel, the SEC stated that
it would consider proposals regarding employment practices within the
realm of ordinary business. 211 In light of the recent employment litiga-
199 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at 134; White, supra note 8, at 34.
200 See Waltman, supra note 62, at § 3, 12.
201 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4; White, supra note 8, at 34.
202 See White, supra note 8, at 33.
203 See Mitsubishi Picketing Concerning Lawsuits is Readied By Groups, supra note 48, at 133.
204 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at B4; Sullivan & Sharpe, supra note 2, at A3.
209 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at 134.
21° See Pulley, supra note 33, at Al; Solomon, supra note 1, at 49-50.
207 See White, supra note 8, at 33.
2°8
 See id.
204 See Church, supra note 15, at 38-39.
210 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(Cell) at 77,287.
Y11 	id.
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Lion, this position cannot be sustained. 212 When the SEC adopted the
ordinary business exception, it intended to relieve companies from
shareholder interference in minor, day-to-day matters. 213 Decisions that
can expose a company to a half-billion dollars in damages and intense
public criticism arc hardly minor or routine.
The ordinary business exception also is rooted in the belief that
management has specialized talents and is more qualified than share-
holders to make certain business decisions.2 " When a company faces
decisions involving important policy issues, it. is difficult to argue that
management has more expertise than the owners of the company,
especially in light of the allegations against top executives in the Tex-
aco and Shoney's lawsuits. 2 ' 5 Indeed, shareholders arc just as qualified
as management to make decisions on social policies like affirmative
action and equal employment opportunity. 216 Management expertise
and competence do not justify a categorical denial of shareholders'
ability to take part in the company's employment policies: 2 ' 7
The costly discrimination lawsuits of recent years and their nega-
tive effects on shareholder value reveal the need for management
accountability to ownership on employment policies. 218 The share-
holder proposal process achieves accountability by forcing manage-
ment to address employment issues. 219 It. further provides shareholders
with greater insurance that the company will not tolerate illegal prac-
tices and the resulting liability. 22" Proposals are a means for sharehold-
ers to communicate to management issues that they deem important
for the company to address. 22 ' The reversal of Cracker Barrel may
protect investors from a loss in shareholder value as a result of costly
employment litigation by making management more accountable to
owners regarding their workplace policies. 222
212 See Price, supra note 13, at Al.
218 See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
214 See id.
215 See id. at 681.
218 See id.
217 See id.
218 See Gaiter, supra note 29, at 1114; Price, supra note 13, at Al.
218 Although shareholder proposals often fail to garner a majority of the ownership vote when
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The SEC must reverse Cracker Barrel because its position is con-
trary to the Congressional intent behind Section 14(a) . 223 The chief
purposes of Section 14(a) arc to encourage corporate suffrage and to
protect investors. 224 Congress delegated to the SEC the power to adopt
rules "as necessary or appropriate . .. for the protection of inves-
tors."225 By prohibiting shareholders from having a say in employment
policies, the SEC is not protecting invcstors. 226 Instead, the SEC leaves
investors at the mercy of management to make decisions on employ-
ment policies that can seriously harm their investment. 227
The SEC has recognized the need to reevaluate its position in
Cracker Barre1. 228
 Perhaps spurred by Congress's mandate in the Na-
tional Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and the widespread criticism
of Cracker Barrel, the SEC has proposed the repeal of its position
which allows companies to automatically exclude employment-related
proposals. 229 The proposed amendments that reverse Cracker Barrel,
however, do not go far enough to ensure shareholder involvement in
employment policies. 2" Although it appears that the proposed repeal
of Cracker Barrel would expand shareholder access to proxy state-
ments by allowing a broader range of includable proposals, there is no
guarantee that employment-related proposals will be included. 23 ' In-
stead of adopting a bright line test to include employment-related
proposals in proxy materials, the SEC proposed to return to a case-by-
case determination of whether proposals are excludable. 2" The social
significance of a proposal again would be decided based on an SEC
staff member's subjective evaluation of the proposal." Therefore, pro-
posals involving important social issues could still be excluded under
14a-8(c) (7). 234
223 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a);J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); Medical Comm.,
432 F.2d at 680-81.
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 7811(a); Borak, 377 U.S. at 431.
225 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
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229 See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, 11997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
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Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) at 89,849.
230 See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093 11997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
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For example, proposals requesting equal employment opportunity
data and information on affirmative action programs could be ex-
cluded as they were in the Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. no-action letter
before Cracker Barrel. 235 The SEC once again could reason that al-
though the proposal involved a significant policy issue, the proposal
was within the ordinary business operations, exception because the
information it requested was too detailed."' The proposed return
to subjective decisionmaking by the SEC staff provides no assurances
that proposals dealing with employment policies that could potentially
harm shareholder value will be included on the proxy materials. 2s" The
proposed case-by-case approach to employment-related proposals will
return the shareholder proposal process to the uncertainty of the
pre-Cracker Barrel days. 2 ' Although questionable on policy grounds,
the Cracker Barrel standard provided certainty for shareholders and
companies as to the excludability of proposals.'" Before Cracker Bar-
rel, the SEC often reached inconsistent decisions in its no-action let-
ters. 2'0 The SEC wavered on whether proposals involving affirmative
action and equal employment opportunity data could be omitted un-
der 14a-8(c) (7) . 241 Instead of returning to a case-by-case approach, the
SEC should amend 14a-8(c) (7) to provide certainty to the shareholder
proposal process.'"
Furthermore, the SEC should not return to case-by-case determi-
nations of excludability because it is not the appropriate body to
evaluate the merits of proposals that involve social issues. 2 'A The pur-
pose of the SEC is to regulate the transfer of securities, not to evaluate
the importance of social policy decisions.'" In the Cracker Barrel
no-action letter, the SEC admitted that it felt uncomfortable in its role
23f'
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relates to ordinary business operations); AT&T No•Action Letter, 1988 WL 235275, at *14 (pro-
posal dealing with affirmative action did not relate to ordinary business operations because
involved social policy issues).
239 See Cracker Barrel No Action Letter, 11992-93 Transfer Binder' Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)
at 77,287.
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of line drawing on proposals with social policy considerations. 245 The
proposed amendments do not improve shareholder access to the proxy
materials because they place proposals at the mercy of an agency that
is not equipped and does not want to draw lines on social policy
issues. 2"
Instead, the SEC must adopt a clear standard on employment
shareholder proposals whereby if a proposal deals with employment
decisions that can adversely impact shareholder value, the proposal
does not relate to ordinary business and cannot be excluded under
14a-8(c) (7).247 Employment decisions that have the potential to seri-
ously harm the financial condition of a company no longer would be
excluded under the false assumption that such decisions are ordi-
nary. 248 Furthermore, this standard would not rely on subjective policy
determinations by an SEC staff member. 249
Such a standard would provide management accountability. 2" The
ownership of a company would have an active role in major employ-
ment decisions that could seriously impact the company's financial
condition. 251 Shareholders no longer would be excluded from employ-
ment decisions based on the false assumption that they lack the com-
petence that management possesses to make such decisions. 252 If an
employment policy decision could result in a financially damaging
lawsuit, shareholders are just as qualified as management to be in-
volved in those decisions. 2"
The standard I suggest would bring Rule 14a-8 back in line with
the Congressional purposes of Section 14(a)--to protect investors and
encourage corporate suffrage. 254 By presenting proposals on major
employment policies, shareholders would have a voice in matters that
can seriously harm their investment. 255 Furthermore, such a rule pro-
tects investors from the potential of costly lawsuits because of biased
management decisionmaking on employment issues.'" The standard I
245 See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCI I) at 77,287.
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propose would return the SEC to its proper role in adopting rules as
"necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protec-
tion of inVestors."262
In addition, this standard would eliminate the uncertainty remain-
ing after the Capital Cities/ABC no-action letter. 2" Proposals request-
ing information about a company's equal employment opportunity
and affirmative action programs would not be excludable under this
standard.25' Because decisions on affirmative action and equal oppor-
tunity employment can result in financial and public relations setbacks,
the proposals would not fall under the ordinary business exception. 26°
Although this standard would involve some line-drawing by the
SEC on what employment policies could be harmful to a company, it
would provide much more certainty than the subjective decisionmak-
ing proposed in the atnendments. 26 ' A case-by-case determination of
the potential for costly lawsuits resulting from an employment policy
involves more objective criteria than the determination of the impor-
tance of a social issue. 262 Furthermore, the SEC is more qualified and
would be more comfortable in making determinations about the finan-
cial consequences of employment decisions than about social policy
issues.263
CONCLUSION
The need for the repeal of Cracker Barrel is apparent with the
increased threat to shareholder value in recent years from costly em-
ployment lawsuits. The proposed reversal of Cracker Barrel and return
to case-by-case determinations by the SEC staff is not the answer.
Instead, the SEC should adopt a standard that would make shareholder
proposals beyond the realm of the ordinary business exception when
they deal with employment decisions that could result in loss in share-
holder value.
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